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Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater. The Fourth
Circuit Rejects a State Duty of Affirmative Protection in
Pinder v. Johnson
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are
called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping
the law of the future, but because of some accident of
immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings
and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise
a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously
was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled
principles of law will bend.'
Consider the following:2 A child is abused by his father. The
child protective services department of the county in which the two
live is made aware of the abuse on various occasions. An agent of
the county sees firsthand the child's bruises and knows of the child's
many trips to the hospital for treatment of mysterious illnesses. But
the state effectively does nothing. Eventually, the father beats the
child so severely that he falls into a coma and must undergo brain
surgery, which reveals, written clearly on the child's brain itself,
evidence of the extended abuse. The child will thereafter be
profoundly retarded and permanently institutionalized.
Using Justice Holmes's analysis, these are hard facts of an
"immediate overwhelming interest which appeal] to the feelings and
distort[] the judgment."3 For a court to base an opinion solely on
that interest, those feelings, that distorted judgment, would be to
make bad law, to make "what previously was clear seem doubtful, and
... even well settled principles of law.., bend."4 And so, dealing
with hard facts like the ones above, the United States Supreme Court
1. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
2. The following hypothetical is based closely on the facts of DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), which are set out in more detail infra
at notes 113-27 and accompanying text. Compare the use of a similar analytical technique
in Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional Tort:
DeShaney and Its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REv. 107, 111-12 (1991), basing a hypothetical
upon the facts of an actual case to illustrate the critical issue in DeShaney.
3. Northern Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 400 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4. I1d at 401 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services5
found that, because the state had done nothing in the case of the
abuse of Joshua DeShaney but merely be aware of it, no duty had
arisen under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the child such
that the state would be held liable for injuries inflicted by a private
party.6
Now change the hard facts of the hypothetical slightly.7 Suppose
the state had a little more to do with the harm inflicted, perhaps had
even created the danger faced by the child at the hands of his father
on a particular day, or at least enhanced a danger that already
existed. Suppose, for example, that the protective services agent had
the authority to have the father arrested and, after the abuse was
brought to the agent's attention for the first time, she had done so.
The arresting officer, fully informed of the father's prior history by
the child's mother, then assured the mother there was no need for her
to find someone to stay with and protect her child that night; suppose
he even told the mother, knowing she would rely on his judgment,
that it was absolutely safe for her to return to work because the father
would have to stay in jail for the entire night. Because of her reliance
on the officer's word and trust in his authority in the matter, the
mother did return to work, leaving the child alone. Suppose that the
officer, the arm of the state, fully aware of the mother's reliance on
his statements, then released the father that night anyway. Suppose
finally that the father then returned one last time to beat his child and
that as a result the child ended up in a coma, severely retarded for
the rest of his life.
On these facts, equally as hard as the first hypothetical, did the
state cross the indeterminate line between doing nothing and doing
something? If so, does that something give rise to liability for the
child's injuries? If not, is there simply no remedy?
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently had the oppor-
tunity to explore these questions in Pinder v. Johnson,' which
involved facts analogous to the second hypothetical above, in light of
5. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
6. Id at 201-02.
7. This second hypothetical is based on the facts of Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169
(4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 530 (1995). See infra notes 19-43 and accom-
panying text for full discussion of the Pinder facts. The juxtaposition of the Pinder facts
with those of DeShaney is intended to illustrate the subtle differences between the two
cases and to underscore that, while the results were the same in both cases, these
differences could have led to different outcomes.
8. 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 530 (1995).
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the recently decided DeShaney case. In Pinder, the Fourth Circuit
declared that it intended in its en banc review of the case to "define
the contour's of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when a
plaintiff aleges an affirmative duty on the part of a police officer to
protect citizens from the actions of a third party."9 The plaintiff
claimed that a police officer's failure to protect the plaintiff and her
three young children from the plaintiff's former boyfriend constituted
a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to "life,
liberty, [and] property" as well as "the equal protection of the
laws."'10  The Fourth Circuit, however, disagreed, holding that
because the plaintiff's right to such affirmative protection, if it existed
at all, was not clearly established at the time of the events giving rise
to the litigation, the officer did not violate the plaintiff's due process
rights by failing to provide that protection."
This Note summarizes the facts of Pinder and the procedural
history from the district court's opinion through the Fourth Circuit's
en banc review.'2 It then briefly explains the relevant background
of the qualified immunity defense in § 1983 actions, centering on the
test set forth by the Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.3 This
is followed by a discussion of state officials' affirmative duty to
protect, as illustrated by the DeShaney decision, which was decided
9. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1171. The text of § 1983 is set out infra at note 62.
10. Pinder v. Commissioners of Cambridge, 821 F. Supp. 376,382,387 (D. Md. 1993),
affd sub nom. Pinder v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th
Cir.), cerL denied, 116 S. Ct. 530 (1995); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The plaintiff's
equal protection claim was predicated on the fact that the case arose out of a domestic
abuse situation. Pinder, 821 F. Supp. at 382. Alleging that the defendants "maintained
a custom or policy of 'taking domestic violence against women less seriously than other
assault cases and treating male offenders in incidents of domestic violence more leniently
than offenders in other assault cases,' "the plaintiff claimed that this policy denied her the
equal protection of the law in this case. Id. (quoting Plaintiffs Complaint at 1 29). The
district court found that Pinder had sufficiently alleged facts supporting her equal
protection claim and denied defendants' motion to dismiss this count of plaintiffs suit. Id.
at 386. This claim was not an issue in the present appeal and thus was not dealt with by
the Fourth Circuit in its en banc review. See Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1171 (stating that en banc
review was granted to deal with allegations of affirmative duty).
11. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1172. The court relied on Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818-19 (1982), which set forth the test for determining whether qualified immunity would
attach under the circumstances of a given case. See Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1173. For a brief
description of the facts and holding of Harlow, see infra notes 65-67 and accompanying
text. The Harlow test is examined in more detail infra at notes 80-88 and accompanying
text.
12. See infra notes 19-61 and accompanying text.
13. 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see infra notes 62-106 and accompanying text.
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immediately prior to the events giving rise to the Pinder case.14 The
Note then analyzes the Pinder decision, including "the contrary
decisions of the other circuit courts of appeals and the basis for the
dissenting opinion in Pinder.5 The Note posits that, although the
Pinder outcome is arguably consistent with the law as it existed at the
time the events took place, the court's analysis was misguided: The
court misevaluated the facts of the case as substantively identical to
those of DeShaney and dismissed the action on the basis of that case's
holding-that a mere awareness of danger and a promise of aid do
not create an affirmative duty to protect. 6 In so doing, the court
disregarded the potential application of a separate and distinct
category of affirmative duty, that of state-created or state-enhanced
danger. While this theory of liability may or may not have saved
Pinder's claim, depending on whether that claim was clearly es-
tablished as a category of legal duty, for the sake of future affirmative
duty plaintiffs the court should not have minimized it. The Note
concludes that the latter analysis could allow the Pinder dismissal to
stand, yet would perhaps aid in establishing more clearly the
parameters of affirmative duty law in its various forms for subsequent
plaintiffs 7 so as to lessen the lingering confusion in this area of the
law. 8
On the evening of March 10, 1989, Officer Donald Johnson of the
Cambridge, Maryland Police Department responded to a call
reporting a domestic disturbance at the home of Carol Pinder.19
Pinder had received a call that evening at work, informing her that
her former boyfriend Don Pittman had broken into her house and
"was threatening violence."' Johnson arrived at the home shortly
after Pinder.2' Pinder told Johnson that when she arrived Pittman
was abusive and violent-he pushed, punched, and threw objects at
14. See infra notes 107-58 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 159-243 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 244-59 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
18. See Karen M. Blum, DeShaney: Custody, Creation of Danger, and Culpability, 27
LoY. L.A. L. REV. 435,478-79 (1994) (noting that, with respect to affirmative duty theory
under the Due Process Clause, "the lower court opinions in this area reflect a sense of
confusion and a need for guidelines and principles beyond the foundation poured in
DeShaney").
19. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1172.
20. Pinder v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 368, 369 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 530 (1995).
21. Id. at 369.
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her' (most notably, a microwave oven),' and screamed at Pinder
and her children that "he would murder them all."'24 Johnson
observed that there were broken panes of glass from the back door
where Pittman had gained access.' A neighbor managed to restrain
Pittman until Johnson arrived, but when Johnson attempted to
question Pittman, he was "hostile and unresponsive.126
Johnson placed Pittman under arrest, secured him in the squad
car, and then returned to the house to talk with Pinder.27 Pinder
told Johnson that Pittman had threatened her in the past and had
recently been released from prison following a conviction for
attempted arson at Pinder's home ten months earlier." Pinder also
told Johnson that Pittman was still on probation 9 Pinder needed
to return to work but was concerned for the safety of her children,
lest she leave them at home alone and Pittman return to carry out his
threats." Pinder alleged that she specifically asked Johnson whether
it would be safe for her to return to work or whether she should
remain at home with the children.3' Not only did Johnson assure
Pinder that Pittman would be locked up overnight, but he also told
her that she would have to wait until the following morning to swear
out a warrant against Pittman as no county commissioner would be
available until then.32 Relying on these assurances, Pinder returned
to work?3
In fact, Johnson did bring Pittman before a county commissioner
that evening for an initial appearance.34 He charged Pittman with
22. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1172.
23. Pinder v. Commissioners of Cambridge, 821 F. Supp. 376,381 (D. Md. 1993), affd
sub nom. Pinder v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 530 (1995).
24. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1172.
25. Pinder, 821 F. Supp at 381.
26. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1172.
27. Id-
28. Id. In fact, Johnson observed Pittman threatening Pinder, stating that he" 'wasn't
going to jail for nothing this time; this time it would be for murder.' " Id. at 1180 (Russell,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added). This statement arguably indicated Pittman's sincerity by
underscoring his past attempt to carry out his threats. See id. at 1172.
29. Pinder, 821 F. Supp. at 381. For the prior break-in and arson attempt, Pittman had
been sentenced to 18 months in prison, with a 12-month suspended sentence, followed by
three years of supervision. Id.
30. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1172.
31. Pinder v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 368, 369 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 530 (1995).
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two misdemeanors-trespassing and malicious destruction of property
worth less than $300.2' As a result, the county commissioner
released Pittman on his own recognizance after he had been in
custody for about one hour,36 warning him not to return to Pinder's
home. Pinder was at work and her three children were sleeping at
home when Pittman was released. Pinder contended that Johnson
made no attempt to warn or contact her about Pittman's release, nor
did Johnson monitor Pittman in any way after his release, despite
Johnson's knowledge of the potential for imminent danger faced by
Pinder and her children at Pittman's hands.39
After his release, Pittman took the ten-minute walk from the
police station directly to Pinder's home.' He broke in a third time
and set fire to the house, killing all three children.4' Pittman was
arrested later that night, charged with arson and three counts of first-
degree murder, and held without bond.42 He later pleaded guilty
and is currently serving three life sentences without the possibility of
parole.43
Pinder subsequently brought a civil suit on behalf of herself and
the estates of her three children against Johnson and the Commis-
sioners of Cambridge 4 seeking damages under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that the defendants had deprived her and her children
of their constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the
35. 1d. This property presumably consisted of the broken glass and the microwave,
which was destroyed when Pittman threw it at Pinder. Pinder v. Commissioners of
Cambridge, 821 F. Supp. 376, 381 (D. Md. 1993), af'd sub nom. Pinder v. Johnson, 33
F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cerL denied, 116 S. Ct.
530 (1995).
36. Id.
37. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1172.
38. Id.
39. Pinder, 821 F. Supp. at 381.
40. Pinder v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 368, 370 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir.)




44. Id. Pinder's state tort action against Cambridge was dismissed by the district court
because "a municipality is immune from actions pursuant to its governmental functions,
... [and] the operation of the police force is a governmental function." Pinder v.
Commissioners of Cambridge, 821 F. Supp. 376,403 (D. Md. 1993), affd sub nom. Pinder
v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 530 (1995). The plaintiff did not contest this point other than with
"some conclusory statements ... that Defendants were acting in a ministerial or
discretionary capacity and not as part of its [sic] governmental function." Id.
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Fourteenth Amendment.45 Johnson moved to dismiss the complaint,
arguing in the alternative that (1) the Constitution imposed no
affirmative duty upon him to protect the Pinders from Pittman; and
(2) even if such a duty were found to exist, Johnson would be shielded
from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity" because the
right to such protection was not clearly established at the time he
acted (or failed to act).47 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland held that a jury could potentially find that Johnson violated
what was indeed a clearly established right in failing to protect Pinder
and her children.4s Thus the court denied Johnson's motion to
dismiss Pinder's due process claim based on the alleged right to
affirmative protection.49
Johnson brought an interlocutory appeal under Mitchell v.
Forsyth, which permits immediate appeal from denials of qualified
immunity.' A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit agreed with the
district court, finding first that Pinder had stated a cognizable due
process claim,"' and second that Johnson was not entitled to
qualified immunity as a matter of law because Pinder's due process
right had indeed been clearly established as of the time Johnson acted
or failed to act.52
The Fourth Circuit, however, subsequently granted an en banc
rehearing and reversed the panel's finding in a nine to four
decision,53 holding that any right on Pinder's behalf to affirmative
45. Pinder, 33 F.3d at 370. Pinder's due process claim was based on the "special
relationship" that allegedly arose between Johnson and the Pinders by virtue of his
knowledge of the existing danger and promise to provide aid. See Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1175.
46. Pinder, 33 F.3d at 370.
47. Id. at 372.
48. Pinder, 821 F. Supp. at 402.
49. Id. at 380.
50. 472 U.S. 511, 518, 530 (1985) (holding that the denial of qualified immunity is
immediately appealable as a collateral order under Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949), to the extent that the decision turns on a question of law); see also
Johnson v. Jones, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (1995) (holding that the "portion of a district
court's summary judgment order that, though entered in a 'qualified immunity' case,
determines only a question of 'evidence sufficiency,' Le., which facts a party may, or may
not, be able to prove at trial," is not appealable as a collateral order).
51. Pinder v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 368, 371 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir.)
(en banc), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 530 (1995). The court cited Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S.
226 (1991), as authority for making this initial assessment of the plaintiff's claim. Pinder,
33 F.3d at 370 n.1; see infra notes 164-83 and accompanying text for further discussion of
Siegert.
52. Pinder, 33 F.3d at 374.
53. The decision was not as decisive as the lopsided vote suggests. The holding indeed
garnered 9 votes, but the majority opinion received only 7 out of 13 votes for parts I-IV,
1996] 1725
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
protection was not clearly established at the time Johnson failed to
protect her and the children, and thus Johnson was entitled to
qualified immunity from liability for that failure.54 In fact, the court
held that under DeShaney 5 the right asserted by Pinder was
expressly rejected at the time of the events in question. Under the
test set forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,56 because the right was not
clearly established at the time Johnson acted, he could not have known
that he was violating any such right (regardless of whether the right
was clear at the time of trial).' Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held
that he was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions. 8
The dissenting opinion disagreed not only with the holding of the
majority, but also with the majority's characterization of the facts of
the case. This characterization, in which the majority "casually
disregard[ed] the very real ways in which Officer Johnson's conduct
placed Pinder and her children in a position of danger," formed the
basis of the dissenters' disagreement with the holding. 9 The dissent
acknowledged the rule of law set forth in DeShaney, relied on by the
majority to reject the right asserted by Pinder.60 But the dissent
argued that the majority's view of the facts and characterization of
Pinder's right was neither the only possible analysis, nor the correct
analysis, of Pinder's claim. The dissent instead would have placed
Pinder's claim in the category of state-created danger, and concluded
that the right to protection under these circumstances was indeed
clearly established at the time Johnson acted such that liability for any
harm caused would attach.61
Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 will lie against "[e]very person"
who, acting "under color" of state law, deprives another of any
constitutional right or privilege.' However, "government officials
and only 6 out of 13, a plurality, for part V (a discussion in "slippery slope" terms of the
policy dangers of allowing Pinder's suit against Johnson to continue; see 54 F.3d at 1178-
79). Two judges concurred in the result only, and four judges dissented altogether: Chief
Judge Ervin; Judge Russell (author of panel opinion); Judge Michael (who joined in the
panel opinion); and Judge Murnaghan.
54. Id at 1172.
55. See infra notes 109-35 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
57. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
58. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1172.
59. I at 1179 (Russell, J., dissenting).
60. Id at 1180 (Russell, J., dissenting); see infra notes 109-35 and accompanying text.
61. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1179-80 (Russell, J., dissenting); see infra notes 152-55 and
accompanying text.
62. The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides:
1726 [Vol. 74
1996] STATE DUTY TO PROTECT 1727
are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages."6'
The scope of this immunity varies depending on the official's role or
function in government, and qualified immunity, rather than absolute
immunity, "represents the norm" for executive officials.'
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,65 the United States Supreme Court
considered whether absolute immunity should be granted to White
House aides involved in the alleged unlawful discharge of A. Ernest
Fitzgerald, a Department of the Air Force employee, by President
Richard M. Nixon. In a decision handed down the same day as
Harlow, the Supreme Court granted absolute immunity to Nixon,66
but Harlow denied the same absolute immunity to the aides, holding
that it would be "untenable to hold absolute immunity an incident of
the office of every Presidential subordinate based in the White
House."
67
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
63. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). The Court explained the rationale
behind this immunity: "As recognized at common law, public officers require this
protection to shield them from undue interference with their duties and from potentially
disabling threats of liability." Id. For example, between 1961 and 1983 the number of.
suits brought against government officials each year rose from 500 to 27,000. D.C. Circuit
Review, Interpreting Harlow and Its Progeny, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1047, 1048 n.2
(1988); see also Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 in the Second Circuit, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
285, 287 n.11 (1983) (noting that approximately 47,000 § 1983 actions were filed in federal
courts between September 1991 and September 1992). But see infra note 250 (discussing
possible exaggeration of this "litigation explosion"). For discussion of the origins of
immunity, see David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Government
Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 5-40 (1972); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments
and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19-39 (1963); Ann Woolhandler,
Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 414-77
(1987).
64. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807. For example, the Court noted that
[flor officials whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete
protection from suit, we have recognized the defense of "absolute immunity."
The absolute immunity of legislators, in their legislative functions ... and of
judges, in their judicial functions... now is well settled. Our decisions also have
extended absolute immunity to certain officials of the Executive branch....
[including] prosecutors and similar officials, ... executive officers engaged in
adjudicative functions ... and the President of the United States ....
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
65. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
66. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
67. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 809.
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The Court in Harlow relied on an earlier case, Butz v.
Economou, to defend its decision to deny absolute immunity to
executive officials against claims that this denial would increase the
likelihood of frivolous claims.6" In Butz, the Court denied absoluteimmunity to certain high-level federal Executive Branch officials. 9
The Harlow Court noted that the Butz Court nonetheless "empha-
sized our expectation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to
trial"7° when it stated:
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal
courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. Unless the
complaint states a compensable claim for relief.., it should
not survive a motion to dismiss.... [D]amage suits concer-
ning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but
can be terminated on a properly supported motion for
summary judgment based on the defense of immunity
,,71
Thus, even though executive officials generally will not be granted
absolute immunity from prosecution, the Harlow Court agreed that
"public policy at least mandates an application of the qualified
immunity standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial
claims without resort to trial."72 In other words, a standard was
needed that would allow the dismissal of such claims on the pleadings,
or at least at the summary judgment stage. Such a test would need
to balance the competing policies of, on the one hand, allowing an
action for damages as "the only realistic avenue for vindication of
68. Id at 807-08 (citing 438 U.S. 478 (1978)).
69. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 485 (1978). The plaintiff in Butz was a
commodity futures trader, whose company was at one time registered with the Department
of Agriculture. The plaintiff alleged that in retaliation for his prior criticisms of the
Commodity Exchange Authority-which he claimed to have voiced in an effort to improve
the regulation of commodity trading-several administrative officials had undertaken an
investigation and various administrative proceedings against him in an attempt to have his
company's registration revoked or suspended. Id. at 481-82. The federal executive
officials named -in the lawsuit included the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of
Agriculture; the Judicial Officer and Chief Hearing Examiner from the administrative
proceedings; the Department of Agriculture attorney who had prosecuted the administra-
tive proceedings; several officials of the Commodity Exchange Authority, including the
administrator of the Authority, the director of its Compliance Division, and the deputy
director of its Registration and Audit Division; and several of the auditors who had
investigated or acted as witnesses against the plaintiff. Id at 482 & n.2. The plaintiff also
named as defendants the United States, the Department of Agriculture, and the
Commodity Exchange Authority. Id at 482 n.3.
70. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 808.
71. Id (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 507).
72. Id. at 813.
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constitutional guarantees,"'73 and, on the other hand, preventing the
fear of being sued from " 'dampen[ing] the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching
discharge of their duties.' "I
After rejecting absolute immunity for executive officials, the
Supreme Court in Butz identified the qualified immunity doctrine as
the "best attainable accommodation of [these] competing values."75
The test for the application of this immunity, as it existed at the time
of the Court's decision in Butz, 76 contained both an objective and a
subjective element. The objective element involved a presumptive
knowledge of and respect for "basic, unquestioned constitutional
rights, '77 while the subjective aspect entailed the "permissible
intentions 7 1 of the actor in question. If the official "knew or
reasonably should have known that the action he took ... would
violate the constitutional fights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the
action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of [those]
rights,, 79 then immunity would not attach.
As the Harlow Court noted, however, "[t]he subjective element
of the good-faith defense frequently has proved incompatible with our
admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to
trial."' The question of an official's intent at the time he deprived
a plaintiff of her constitutional fights is a question of fact that "some
courts have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury";
further, "substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective good
faith of government officials."'" To preserve the policy of allowing
early dismissal of hollow claims, the Harlow Court removed the
subjective element of the test, providing a new framework to be used
in actions against federal officials such as the one in Harlow, as well
as in actions against state officials under § 1983 like that in Pinder.s
73. It. at 814.
74. Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
75. Id. (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 507-08).
76. The test for the application of qualified immunity had been established by the
Supreme Court in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975).
77. I& at 322.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1982).
81. it at 816.
82. The Court acknowledged that the Harlow case, an action against federal officials,
presented no issue with regard to state officials' immunity to suit for constitutional
violations under § 1983. Id at 818 n.30. However, the Court also pointed out that it had
previously found it " 'untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law
1996] 1729
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The Court in Harlow held that "government officials performing
discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known."' Under this objective test, the judge determines on
a motion for summary judgment (1) whether a violation of a
constitutional right has been alleged,' 4 and (2) whether the law
creating that right was clearly established at the time of the events in
question,85 such that (3) a reasonable official would know that his
conduct violated that right, and "should be made to hesitate 8 6
before acting. An official will not be punished for violating a right of
which he could not reasonably be expected to have known, and he
will not be held responsible for predicting subsequent developments
in the law with respect to his conduct.' In consideration of the
Court's concerns regarding efficiency and executive officials' fear of
litigation, the objective Harlow test will, in the Court's view, avoid
"excessive disruption of government" by allowing the dismissal of
between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under
the Constitution against federal officials.' " Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
504 (1978)).
83. Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
84. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991) ("A necessary concomitant to the
determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is 'clearly
established' at the time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff
has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all."). In DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d
790 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit disagreed with other circuits that had interpreted
Siegert as adding an extra preliminary inquiry into the immunity framework-that of the
present state of the law as to the allegedly violated right: "Although the Supreme Court's
decision in [Siegert] has generated significant confusion, that case did not, contrary to the
view of almost every court, effect a fundamental change in [the] analytical framework for
deciding whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity." Id. at 795. See infra notes
164-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of this aspect of the Harlow test, the Fourth
Circuit's dispute with other circuits regarding the meaning of Siegert, and the Fourth
Circuit's application of the test in Pinder.
85. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. According to the Fourth Circuit, the only inquiry in an
immunity determination is whether the actor violated a right known at the time he acted.
See DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 797 ("[Siegert] did not direct courts to decide, independent of and
prior to addressing a defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity, whcther a plaintiff has
stated a claim upon which relief can be granted [under current law].").
86. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
87. Id. at 818; see also Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 1991) ("Where
there is a legitimate question as to whether the officer's conduct would objectively violate
the plaintiff's right, qualified immunity 'gives police officers the necessary latitude to
pursue their [duties] without having to anticipate, on the pain of civil liability, future
refinements or clarifications of constitutional law.' ") (quoting Tarantino v. Baker, 825 F.2d
772, 775 (4th Cir. 1987)).
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many meritless claims at an early stage of litigation, even before
discovery is allowed.88
In Malley v. Briggs,89 the Supreme Court continued to develop
the objective qualified immunity test it created in Harlow. Referring
to the Harlow standard as one that "gives ample room for mistaken
judgments,"9 the Court in Malley stated the test as to the officer's
reasonableness in generous, albeit negative, terms: "Defendants will
not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no
reasonably competent officer would have concluded that [the officer's
conduct was within the law]; but if officers of reasonable competence
could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized." 91
Thus, the qualified immunity defense "provides ample protection to
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.")92
The Court in Harlow did not define the term "clearly es-
tablished" or explain just how clearly a right need be established
before knowledge of it could be imputed to an officer acting in
violation of it.9' The Court addressed this issue in Anderson v.
88. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
89. 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
90. Id. at 343.
91. Id. at 341. Malley involved an officer's determination as to whether arrest
warrants should have been issued for the arrest of the Malleys, prominent members of the
community, on the basis of a wiretapped telephone conversation that the officer believed
referred to marijuana possession during a party at their home. Id. at 337-38. The Court
affirmed the First Circuit Court of Appeals' application of the objective reasonableness
test to the officer's conduct, reversing the directed verdict of the District Court for the
District of Rhode Island. Id. at 339. The district court based its decision in part on a
finding that "an officer who believes that the facts stated in his affidavit are true and who
submits them to a neutral magistrate may thereby be entitled to immunity under the
'objective reasonableness' standard" of Harlow if in fact the arrest warrant was issued
based on insufficient facts. 1d. at 338-39 (emphasis added). This was in error because it
only inquired into the subjective belief of the officer in question. See id at 339; see also
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (emphasizing that an officer's "subjective
beliefs.., are irrelevant").
92. Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. The Court later explained that "if no officer of reasonable
competence would have requested the warrant," then the request of the officer in question
based on the facts in his possession was "outside the range of the professional competence
expected of an officer." Id. at 346, n.9.
93. See Schwartz, supra note 63, at 310:
[T]he Supreme Court has provided very little guidance on how to evaluate
whether the federal law was "clearly established." As a result, the circuit courts
are not in accord as to what body of law should be considered and "[e]ven within
the same circuit, there is not always agreement on whether the contours of the
right have been clearly established."
(citation omitted); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-
Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1733, 1751 (1991) ("In
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Creighton.94 Anderson involved a warrantless search of the plaintiff
family's home, conducted in the erroneous belief that a suspected
bank robber may have been hiding inside. 5 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider whether the officer conducting the
search should have been granted qualified immunity from liability for
violating the plaintiffs' constitutional right to be free from warrantless
searches without probable cause, if the officer could establish, based
on the Harlow test, that "a reasonable officer could have believed the
search to be lawful. 9 6
In applying the Harlow "clearly established" test, the Court noted
that difficulty could arise in determining the degree of specificity with
which the right must be established in order to be clearly established.
The operation of the standard
depends substantially upon the level of generality at which
the relevant "legal rule" is to be identified. For example,
the right to due process of law is quite clearly established by
the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which
any action that violates that Clause (no matter how unclear
it may be that the particular action is a violation) violates a
clearly established right.97
If the right allegedly violated is defined in its most expansive sense,
it could almost always be worded in terms of a violation of an abstract
constitutional right, which itself would certainly be clearly established.
With clever pleading, a plaintiff could always survive the summary
judgment stage based on a clearly established, although very general,
constitutional right. This would completely eviscerate the Court's
"clearly established" test.98 As long as a plaintiff pleaded in general
constitutional terms, no right would ever be found not to have been
clearly established,99 and thus it would become "impossible for
Harlow, the Court declined to specify whether 'the state of the law' should be evaluated
by reference to Supreme Court, court of appeals or district court opinions. Nearly ten
years later, the question remains unresolved.") (citation omitted).
94. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
95. l& at 637.
96. Id. at 638.
97. I& at 639.
98. The Court feared that "[pilaintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified
immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply
by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights." kIt As a result, "Harlow would be
transformed from a guarantee of immunity into a rule of pleading." Id.
99. This is true at least with respect to a judgment based on the pleadings or a
summary judgment motion: More claims would be forced past this early resolution stage,
thus defeating the purpose of the qualified immunity defense--"avoid[ing] excessive
disruption of government and permit[ting] the resolution of many insubstantial claims on
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officials 'reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise
to liability for damages.' ""0
To solve this problem, the Court pointed to prior cases that
"establish that the right the official is alleged to have violated must
have been 'clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence
more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right."'10' Without further explanation, this does not
seem to be any more specific a definition than was provided in
Harlow; but the Court continued: "This is not to say that an official
action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in
question has previously been held unlawful,["a] ... but it is to say
that in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be ap-
parent."'" Thus, although a case on all fours need not have been
previously decided in the plaintiff's favor,"°4 the case law must
establish the right with sufficient particularity that it should have been
clear to the officer in question, in light of the particular circumstances,
the officer's knowledge and information, and the case law.05 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Anderson erred by refusing even
to consider the qualified immunity argument in light of the specific
circumstances confronting the officer. Instead, the court applied a
summary judgment." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
100. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639 (quoting Davis v. Sherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)).
101. Id. at 640.
102. Id.; see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 n.12 (1985) (noting that an official
will not necessarily always enjoy immunity from suit simply because the requirement for
a search warrant "has never explicitly been held to apply" to a search conducted under
circumstances similar to those in the present case) (emphasis added).
103. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (citations omitted).
104. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1173; see also Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir.
1992) (" 'Clearly established' in this context includes not only already specifically
adjudicated rights, but those manifestly included within more general applications of the
core constitutional principle invoked."); McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319,1325 (4th Cir.
1987) ("Clearly... public officers should not automatically receive qualified immunity
simply because there is not a strict factual nexus between their actions and the precedent
establishing the right allegedly violated. Public officials must consider the possible
relevance of legal principles established in analogous factual contexts."); cf. Collinson v.
Gott, 895 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 1990) (Phillips, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing
that the lack of federal court decisions at the time of the incident addressing the right's
application to the particular circumstances defendant confronted did not establish qualified
immunity per se, but noting that it "surely bears heavily on whether the unlawfulness of
the conduct challenged ... should have been apparent to a reasonable official in [the
defendant's] position") (citation omitted)).
105. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640-41; see also Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213,216 (4th Cir.
1991) ("[T]he plaintiff's rights must be clearly established under the particular circumstan-
ces confronting the official at the time of the questioned action.").
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general, abstract formulation of the right to be free from warrantless
searches without probable cause in finding that that right was clearly
established at the time the officer acted. 6
The criteria for determining whether the specific right to
affirmative protection from the violence of third persons based on the
Due Process Clause has ever been clearly established"° remain
somewhat indeterminate."8 The general rule, set forth in DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 9 is that no
affirmative duty on the part of law-enforcement officers is created by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,"0 because
"nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against
invasion by private actors.""' The Court indicated that the "Clause
is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security."1 2
The facts of DeShaney were hard indeed."' Young Joshua
DeShaney had been repeatedly beaten by his father, Randy
DeShaney."4  The Winnebago County Department of Social
106. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640-41.
107. The proper inquiry, the Fourth Circuit emphasized in Pinder, is whether the right
was clearly established at the time of the events underlying that case, regardless of its
present status. See infra notes 161-83 and accompanying text.
108. See Blum, supra note 18, at 435 ("[A] clear consensus has yet to emerge.").
109. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
110. The relevant text of the amendment is as follows: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... " U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. The claim in DeShaney, a common one in cases
in which the Due Process Clause is invoked as creating an affirmative duty of protection,
was that the government "deprived [the plaintiff] of his liberty interest in 'free[dom] from
... unjustified intrusions on personal security.' " DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195 (quoting
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)). In this context, the alleged deprivation of
liberty interest results from the state's failure to protect a party's liberty interest from
intrusion by a private third party. Id. If a right to such protection is found, then the
failure to provide protection constitutes a deprivation of the liberty interest without due
process. See id. This is substantively identical to the claim brought by Pinder, see infra
notes 193-94 and accompanying text, although Pinder's claim arguably rested on a different
underlying theory than the DeShaney claim, see infra note 209.
111. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
112. Id; see also Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) ("The
Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868 at the height of laissez-faire thinking, sought to
protect Americans from oppression by state government, not to secure them basic
governmental services."); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing
the Constitution as "a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone").
113. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
114. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191. Randy had been awarded custody of Joshua when he
divorced Joshua's mother one year after Joshua's birth. Id. Randy moved with Joshua
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Services (DSS) was first alerted that Randy was abusing Joshua when
Randy's second wife, at the time of their divorce, complained to the
police. 5 The DSS interviewed Randy, but he denied the charges,
and the DSS did not pursue the matter."6 One year later, when
Joshua was three years old, he was admitted to a local hospital with
bruises and abrasions, and the examining physician, suspecting child
abuse, notified the DSS.117 This time, the DSS obtained an order
from Wisconsin juvenile court placing Joshua in the custody of the
hospital, but he was released shortly thereafter, once again into the
custody of his father."'
Over the course of the next year, Joshua was admitted to the
hospital twice for treatment of "suspicious injuries" thought to be
from child abuse."9 A caseworker made monthly visits to the
DeShaney home during which she noticed a number of "suspicious
injuries" to Joshua's head and also discovered that the protective
measures recommended by the county Child Protection Team and
agreed to by Randy were not being followed." On two of the
caseworker's visits, after a recent trip by Joshua to the hospital, she
was told that "Joshua was too ill to see her."' The caseworker
noted all of these incidents in her files, in addition to her "continuing
suspicions that someone in the DeShaney household was physically
abusing Joshua."'" At no time did the DSS take any further action
to protect Joshua.'23
In March 1984, Randy beat Joshua so severely that the four-year-
old fell into a life-threatening coma. Brain surgery revealed
hemorrhages due to a series of traumatic injuries to the head, inflicted
shortly after this first divorce and remarried, only to divorce a second time. Id
115. Id- at 192.
116. Ild.
117. Id.
118. Id. An ad hoc "Child Protection Team" convened by the county determined that
there was insufficient evidence of child abuse for Joshua to be retained in the custody of
the court. Id. The Team did recommend several protective measures for Joshua, however,
and Randy entered into a voluntary agreement with the DSS promising to cooperate with
those measures. Id. Unfortunately for Joshua, the juvenile court then dismissed the child
protection case on the recommendation of the Team, and returned Joshua to his father's
custody. Id.
119. Id. at 192-93.
120. Id.
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over time." Joshua suffered such severe brain damage that he is
expected to spend the rest of his life confined to an institution for the
profoundly retarded." Randy Was tried and convicted of child
abuse. 27
Joshua and his mother subsequently brought suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the DSS, alleging that the DSS "had deprived Joshua
of his liberty without due process of law, in violation of his rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, by failing to intervene to protect
him against a risk of violence at his father's hands of which they knew
or should have known.' In affirming the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals' grant of summary judgment for the DSS,129 the Supreme
Court summarized and explained its position on the fundamental
principles of affirmative duty, such as they existed at the time of its
decision.Y
The DeShaney Court first emphasized the general rule of the
duty of affirmative protection, specifically, that there is none.131 "As
a general matter, then," the Court concluded, "a State's failure to
protect an individual against private violence simply does not
constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.' 3'  The Court
125. Id
126. Id.
127. Id. Randy was given a sentence of two to four years in prison. DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298,300 (7th Cir. 1987), affd, 489 U.S.
189 (1989).
128. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
129. The Seventh Circuit based its dismissal on alternative grounds. First, it concluded
that the Due Process Clause does not require affirmative protection of citizens from
private violence. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 301. The Seventh Circuit thus specifically rejected
the position taken (albeit in dicta) by the Fourth Circuit in Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185,
190-94 (4th Cir. 1984), that "once the state is aware of the danger that a particular child
may be abused, a special relationship arises between it and the child and places on the
state a constitutional duty to protect the child from the abuse." DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 303
(summarizing the Jensen discussion). See infra note 142 for a more detailed discussion of
the Jensen test. Second, the court concluded that the causal nexus between the DSS's
conduct and Joshua's harm was too tenuous to establish a deprivation of constitutional
rights actionable under § 1983. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 301-03. For the latter ground, the
court of appeals relied on Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980).
130. The Court decided DeShaney on February 22, 1989, 16 days before the events that
gave rise to the Pinder action, so DeShaney is a particularly appropriate point of departure
for examining whether the right to affirmative protection claimed under the Finder cir-
cumstances was "clearly established" at the time of the events underlying that action. But
see infra note 192 (discussing improbability of DeShaney's having had any impact on
Officer Johnson's conduct due to the short length of the intervening period of time
between the DeShaney decision and Johnson's conduct).
131. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-97; see supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
132. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197.
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then denied the plaintiff's argument that an exception to this rule
could be found in cases where a "special relationship" existed
between the State and the individual whose liberty was invaded.'33
Such a relationship was created, claimed the plaintiffs, because
the State knew that Joshua faced a special danger of abuse
at his father's hands, and specifically proclaimed, by word
and by deed, its intention to protect him against that danger.
Having actually undertaken to protect Joshua from this
danger ... the State acquired an affirmative "duty,"
enforceable through the Due Process Clause, to do so in a
reasonably competent fashion.T3
In response, the Court plainly stated, "We reject this argument.' ' 35
The idea of an exception for a "special relationship" giving rise
to an affirmative duty arose, the DeShaney Court surmised, from dicta
in Martinez v. California.36 Martinez involved the murder of a
fifteen-year-old girl by a parolee whom the defendants released from
prison, despite their knowledge of "his history, his propensities, and
the likelihood that he would commit another violent crime.', 137 Five
months after his release, the parolee tortured and murdered the
girl. 38 The Court held that the relationship between the girl's death
and the action of the parole board in releasing a known dangerous
criminal was too attenuated to find liability under § 1983 on these
facts.139  However, the opinion made clear that the Court did "not
133. ld. at 197-98. The following discussion of the "special relationship" doctrine
requires some clarification. The category of "special relationship" includes several
different situations. First, the label refers to situations like that in DeShaney, in which the
plaintiff claimed that a special relationship arose from the state's mere awareness of the
plaintiff's potential danger, and created liability for failing to protect from that danger.
The Court in DeShaney denied that this situation constituted a legitimate "special
relationship" giving rise to a duty to protect. Id. However, the term "special relationship"
also embraces the situation in which DeShaney did recognize a duty to protect, the
custodial context. See e.g., Robert C. Slim, Comment, The Special Relationship Doctrine
and a School Official's Duty to Protect Students From Harm, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 215,216
(1994) (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized the existence of a "special
relationship" which gives rise to certain affirmative duties in a number of custodial
situations, including imprisonment, institutionalization, and foster care). For convenience
and clarity, this Note distinguishes the two sub-categories as follows: The "special
relationship" claimed by the plaintiff in DeShaney and rejected by the Court is referred
to as the "special relationship," and the "special relationship" arising in the custodial
context, which survives DeShaney, is referred to as the "custodial context."
134. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 198.
136. Itt at 197 n.4 (citing 444 U.S. 277 (1980)).
137. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 279 (1980).
138. Id. at 279-80.
139. Id. at 285.
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decide that a parole officer could never be deemed to 'deprive'
someone of life by action taken in connection with the release of a
prisoner on parole."'" The determining factor in the Martinez case,
however, was that the parole board "was not aware that [the]
decedent, as distinguished from the public at large, faced any special
danger. ,141
Several federal circuits have interpreted the above language of
the Court to imply that when a parole board (or other state actor) is
aware that a particular party, as distinguished from the public at large,
faces a special danger, and indicates its willingness to protect that
party from that danger, the state would be within the confines of a
"special relationship" to that party, such that a failure to protect the
party from the known danger would deprive him of liberty in
violation of the Due Process Clause. 42 However, the DeShaney
Court, as noted above, specifically rejected the special relationship
exception. 43 If such a category had ever existed before DeShaney,
the Court held it to be rejected thereafter. Because this was the
theory relied upon by the plaintiffs in DeShaney, the Court held that
no duty had arisen to protect Joshua DeShaney and affirmed the
granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.'"
140. Id (emphasis added); see Eaton & Wells, supra note 2, at 153 ("It would be a
mistake ... to treat Martinez as a blanket rejection of all constitutional claims arising from
fact patterns where a private actor is the immediate source of danger.").
141. Martinez, 444 U.S. at 285 (emphasis added).
142. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,198 n.4
(1989) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1988);
Estate of Bailey by Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510-11 (3d Cir. 1985); Jensen
v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 190-94 & n.11 (4th Cir. 1984) (dicta), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052
(1985)). Pinder relied heavily upon Jensen as establishing a special relationship exception
that created an affirmative duty. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1177. The factors the Jensen court
listed as meriting inclusion in a " 'special relationship' analysis" were:
1) Whether the victim or the perpetrator was in legal custody at the time of the
incident, or had been in legal custody prior to the incident.... 2) Whether the
State ha[d] expressly stated its desire to provide affirmative protection to a
particular class or specific individuals.... 3) Whether the State knew of the
claimants' plight.
Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194-95 n.11. However, the Fourth Circuit found that, after DeShaney,
there was "no doubt ... that Jensen and its companion cases arguing for a broad
conception of the special relationship afford no basis for vitiating Johnson's immunity
defense." Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1177.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
144. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193-94.
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The DeShaney Court did, however, recognize a legitimate
exception to the general no-duty rule in the custodial context. 45
Citing several of its previous cases,' 46 the Court acknowledged the
validity of "the proposition that when the State takes a person into its
custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes
upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his
safety and general well-being."' 47  The policy behind such an
exception is that "when the State by the affirmative exercise of its
power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to
care for himself" it cannot "at the same time fail[] to provide for his
basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and
reasonable safety-[without] transgress[ing] the substantive limits on
state action set by ... the Due Process Clause.' 148  In contrast to
the "special relationship" context, where the state merely knew about
a danger to a particular party, in the custodial context the
affirmative duty to protect arises ... from the limitation
which [the State] has imposed on [the individual's] freedom
to act on his own behalf.... In the substantive due process
analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the
individual's freedom to act on his own behalf-through
incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint
of personal liberty-which is the "deprivation of liberty"
triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its
145. Id. at 199-200. Again, the custodial context is a subset of the "special relationship"
category, but for clarity's sake this Note reserves the "special relationship" label for the
type of relationship rejected in DeShaney, as not giving rise to a duty to protect. See supra
note 133. The custodial context in its several forms is virtually the only "special
relationship" that gives rise to such a duty today; in effect, the "special relationship" as a
larger category that included other sub-categories of circumstances giving rise to a duty to
protect was done away with entirely by DeShaney. See Julie Shapiro, Snake Pits and
Unseen Actors: Constitutional Liability for Indirect Harm, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 883, 912
n.114 (1994) (noting that the term "special relationship" is "now essentially limited to
custody situations"); Daniel J. Glivar, Note, Failure to Protect Witnesses: Are Prosecutors
Liable?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1111, 1118 (1991) (noting that "absent a custodial
relationship, courts generally decline to apply special relationship doctrine").
146. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-99 (citing Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S.
239,244 (1983) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires the state to provide medical
care to suspects in police custody who were injured while being apprehended); Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-16 (1982) (discussing the due process rights of involuntarily
committed mental patients to protection of their liberty interests in safety and freedom of
movement); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires the state to
provide adequate medical care to incarcerated prisoners)).
147. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200.
148. Id. at 200.
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failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms
inflicted by other means. 49
In other words, the state has some control over the infliction of the
harm through its control over the individual's freedom to protect
herself. Thus, when the state takes away the individual's means of
self-protection, the affirmative duty arises to supplant it with state
protection. 50 Because the facts of DeShaney did not place the case
within the custodial context exception, the Court (having already
rejected the "special relationship" exception) found that the general
no-duty rule applied.'
The Court did, however, leave an opening for a third possible
exception to the no-duty rule: the state-created or state-enhanced
danger.' Central to the Court's holding that the state actors in
DeShaney owed Joshua no affirmative protection was the fact that the
state actors had themselves not created or contributed to the danger
Joshua faced."3 "While the State may have been aware of the
dangers that Joshua faced in the free world," the Court reasoned,
149. Id (emphasis added).
150. See id
151. Ia at 201.
152. See Eaton & Wells, supra note 2, at 158 ("[DeShaney] affirms ... that a
constitutional duty to protect may arise if there is sufficient state connection with the
plIintiff's need for help."). To be sure, the fact that DeShaney left open the possibility
that a third exception to the no-duty rule existed is not equivalent to the DeShaney Court's
having "clearly established" this exception for the benefit of the plaintiffs in Pinder. In
other words, Officer Johnson's conduct was not necessarily a violation of a "clearly
established" right to affirmative protection because he caused or enhanced the danger
faced by the Pinders, simply because DeShaney did not foreclose this third category.
However, arguably, the right to protection under this third exception was at least on its
way to becoming clearly established on the basis of decisions by lower federal courts that
pre-date DeShaney. See infra note 239-40 and accompanying text. The fact that DeShaney
acknowledged this category's existence implicitly, by noting that the holding applied to
circumstances in which the state did not create or enhance the plaintiff's vulnerability to
danger, DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201, at least accommodates an already existing body of law
attempting to clearly establish this exception. Whether or not the exception had been
relied upon enough times by enough courts to have become clearly established at the time
of Officer Johnson's conduct, the Pinder court should have recognized that the facts of
Pinder fit this third category. In fact, the Fourth Circuit did appear to recognize the
potential for this third exception: "At some point on the spectrum between action and
inaction, the state's conduct may implicate it in the harm caused." Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1175.
But the court simply did not feel that the facts involved had reached that point. See id.
153. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1180 (Russell, J., dissenting). The fact that the state had neither
created nor contributed to Joshua's danger was conceded by the plaintiffs in DeShaney.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197; see also Eaton & Wells, supra note 2, at 154 ("The DeShaney
Court carefully qualified its opinion by noting that the defendant child welfare workers
were not responsible for Joshua's need for protection.").
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it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to
render him any more vulnerable to them. That the State
once took temporary custody of Joshua does not alter the
analysis, for when it returned him to his father's custody, it
placed him in no worse position than that in which he would
have been had it not acted at all. 4
Had the state played any part in creating or exacerbating the danger
Joshua faced, the opinion implies, an affirmative duty might have
arisen, 5 much like that arising in the case in which the state, by
virtue of its affirmative act of taking custody of an individual, renders
itself responsible for some measure of affirmative protection. But
when the "most that can be said of the state functionaries in this case
is that they stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances
dictated a more active role for them"-when those functionaries
specifically did not create or increase Joshua's danger-the no-duty
general rule was applied. 6
After DeShaney, the landscape of the affirmative duty doctrine
consisted of a general rule of no duty to protect from private violence,
with two potential exceptions: the custodial context, and the context
of the state-created or state-enhanced danger. 7  Each of these
exceptions indicates more state involvement in the harm to the
plaintiff than simple knowledge of the danger faced and a willingness
to aid; rather, the state has some measure of control over the harm,
and thus arguably has some affirmative duty to exercise that control
so as not to violate the plaintiff's liberty interests. 8
154. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
155. See Eaton & Wells, supra note 2, at 149.
156. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
157. Blum, supra note 18, at 436-37. Professor Blum designates the latter exception as
the " 'snake-pit' situation," referring to Judge Richard Posner's language in Bowers v.
DeVito: " 'If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then
fails to protect him ... it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a
snake pit.' " Id. at 436 & n.5 (quoting Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (1982)). See
also Shapiro, supra note 145, at 920-45. Professor Shapiro creates five models for indirect
harm cases, of which the snake-pit model is the first. Shapiro states that the snake-pit or
state-created danger cases "are the strongest cases for § 1983 liability." Id. at 926.
158. Contrary to this view of the Due Process Clause as providing a basis for any
affirmative duties is Judge Posner's oft-quoted statement, "The Constitution is a charter
of negative liberties." Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618. The Due Process Clause "was intended
to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government," Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (citations omitted), not necessarily to impose
affirmative duties on government officials. However, for a critical perspective on the
traditional negative-rights view of the Constitution, including a discussion of the historical
and intellectual foundations of this view, see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of
Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L.
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The Fourth Circuit in Pinder faced the difficult task of integrating
two complex and confusing areas of the law: Harlow's qualifiedimmunity test and the law of affirmative duty. 9 After detailing the
facts of the case' 6° and briefly summarizing the basic principles of
qualified immunity,' 6' the Pinder court set out to apply the Harlow
test in order to determine whether the allegedly violated right to
affirmative protection was clearly established, such that a reasonable
person would have known of its existence at the time he acted. 62
The court stated that "[t]his inquiry depends upon an assessment of
the settled law at the time [of the alleged violation], not the law as it
currently exists."' ' The court relied on its own previous decision
in DiMeglio v. Haines'64 for the premise that it need not determine
the present status of the right allegedly violated, but need only
determine the status of the right at the time the party seeking
immunity acted or failed to act." However, this premise is based
on the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the Supreme Court's opinion
in Siegert v. Gilley, 66 which intrepretation represents only one side
of an arguably unsettled debate over the need for a current-law deter-
mination.
RFv. 409 (1990). Professor Gerhardt also explores the significance of rejecting the
traditional view; he proposes an alternate method of constitutional interpretation, utilizing
historical, structural and linguistic contexts, which "reveals the [fEourteenth [A]mendment
as the most potent source of affirmative duties in the Constitution." Id. at 413. Had the
Supreme Court used his method of interpreting constitutional rights, Professor Gerhardt
posits, "DeShaney would have been decided in a radically different way." Id.
159. As to the qualified immunity test, Professor Schwartz wrote that "[a]t first glance
the Supreme Court's qualified immunity case law appears to articulate a fairly workable
set of principles.... But the simplicity is deceiving." Schwartz, supra note 63, at 309. As
for affirmative duty, "[t]he lower courts are obviously struggling to formulate a coherent
theory for applying the 'in custody' and 'state-created danger' exceptions to DeShaney's
no-affirmative-duty rule." Blum, supra note 18, at 471; see also Eaton & Wells, supra note
2, at 110 (stating that the "panoply of approaches" taken by the Court in DeShaney
"reveals the substantial uncertainty that remains in this area of the law, and thus highlights
the need for developing a coherent framework for analyzing affirmative duty cases"). The
intermingling of the doctrines occurs in Pinder because application of the Harlow test for
qualified immunity under the facts of the case requires a determination of whether the
right to affirmative protection was clearly established at the time the events occurred. See
supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
160. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1172.
161. Id at 1173.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 794 (4th Cir. 1995)).
164. 45 F.3d 790 (4th Cir. 1995).
165. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1173 (citing DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 794).
166. 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
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The Siegert Court, discussing the framework of an inquiry into
qualified immunity under Harlow, stated that the plaintiff in the case
"failed to satisfy the first inquiry in the examination of [a claim of
qualified immunity]; he failed to allege the violation of a clearly
established constitutional right."'67 The Court further stated that
"[a] necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the
constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is 'clearly established' at the
time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff
has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all."', In the
words of the Fourth Circuit in DiMeglio, in "the view of almost every
[other] court," Siegert has thus been interpreted as adding an
additional preliminary inquiry to the Harlow test for immunity.69
Not only must the court determine whether the allegedly violated
right was clearly established at the time the defendant acted, such that
a reasonable person in those circumstances would have had construc-
tive knowledge of the state of the law, but the court must determine
167. Id. at 231.
168. Id. at 232.
169. DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 795. The opinion listed cases from a majority of the other
circuits that relied on Siegert for the premise that the first inquiry in an immunity
determination is whether the plaintiff alleges the violation of a constitutional right at all.
Id. at 795-97 (citing, inter alia, LeRoy v. Illinois Racing Bd., 39 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1994);
Brown v. Nix, 33 F3d 951 (8th Cir. 1994); Calhoun v. New York State Div. of Parole
Officers, 999 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1993); Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774 (10th Cir.
1993); Grady v. El Paso Community College, 979 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1992); Silver v.
Franklin Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 966 F.2d 1031 (6th Cir. 1992); Oladeinde v.
City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 987 (1993);
Hunter v. District of Columbia, 943 F.2d 69 (D.C. Cir. 1991)); see also Pritchett v. Alford,
973 F.2d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 1992) (listing as the first inquiry "identification of the specific
right allegedly violated," before listing the second step of "determining whether at the time
of the alleged violation the right was clearly established"). But see Hunter v. Bryant, 502
U.S. 224 (1991), decided in the term after Siegert, in which, "without even citing Siegert,
the Court applied its traditional qualified immunity analysis, never asking whether the
plaintiff's allegations, if accepted as true, stated a claim upon which relief could be
granted." DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 800. The matter is not easily settled. Professors Fallon
and Meltzer note that lower court opinions subsequent to Harlow have yet to reach a
consensus as to whether a judge must discuss the merits of the constitutional right
involved. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 93, at 1752-53 & n.111. Some courts dismiss
cases on qualified immunity grounds without reaching the merits; others deny the plaintiff's
claim on the merits and use qualified immunity as an additional basis for dismissal; and
still others find a valid constitutional claim but dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. Id.
(listing examples of opinions in each of the three categories). The DiMeglio court does
note that the Court in Siegert "invited this very confusion." 45 F.3d at 802; see also infra
notes 244-50 and accompanying text (elaborating on the negative consequences of the
DiMeglio approach to Siegert as illustrated by the Pinder court's reliance on this
approach).
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the current state of the law as to that particular right.170 In the
words of the Harlow Court itself "On summary judgment, the judge
appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law,
but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action
occurred.'' 7
However, the DiMeglio approach to Siegert has found support as
well as criticism among commentators.' According to the Fourth
Circuit in DiMeglio, Siegert did not "effect a fundamental change in
[the Harlow] analytical framework for deciding whether an official is
entitled to qualified immunity."'73 Rather than require a deter-
mination on the merits of the claim, Siegert confirmed the traditional
rule of qualified immunity law that a court must first assess, before
any other inquiry,74 whether the plaintiff has alleged conduct that
170. See Schwartz, supra note 63, at 309 n.144 (summarizing Siegert as holding that
"before resolving the immunity defense[, a] court must first determine whether the plaintiff
has asserted a violation of a constitutional right"). Professor Shapiro interprets Siegert as
requiring an initial look at the current status of a constitutional right because this
interpretation solves a major problem with the Supreme Court's qualified immunity
doctrine:
For a time, the absence of any clearly established law threatened to halt the
development of law in this area [of affirmative duty] because of the approach to
the qualified immunity defense utilized in some circuits.... [S]ome courts evaded
the need to resolve novel constitutional questions presented in § 1983 cases by
reasoning that, even assuming the existence of any constitutional right, it was
certainly not a clearly established right and, hence, the defendant was entitled to
prevail on the basis of qualified immunity. This allowed the court to dismiss the
case without deciding its merits. The constitutional right at issue was no more
clearly established at the end of the case than it had been at the beginning.
In [Siegert], however, the Supreme Court specifically disapproved this
decisional process and directed the lower courts to decide the substantive
questions of liability before the qualified immunity questions [of whether it was
clearly established at the time of the actions in question].
Shapiro, supra note 145, at 899 n.55.
171. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (emphasis added).
172. See 2 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION:
THE LAW OF SECTION 1983, § 8.06 (3d ed. Supp. 1995). Professor Nahmod concludes that
the Fourth Circuit "thoughtfully analyzed" the Siegert decision, and agrees that "Siegert
did not mandate a determination under current law" of whether the plaintiff had stated
a claim for relief. Id. (emphasis added).
173. DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 795.
174. See Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983's
Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 781 n.119 (1992) (characterizing Siegert as one of
many recent decisions that "reflect the federal courts' renewed determination to afford
defendants an early resolution" of lawsuits). Seen in this light, Siegert does not add a
substantive inquiry to the immunity framework; rather, it allows for the substantive inquiry
already inherent in the immunity framework to be made at a slightly earlier stage in the
litigation, on the basis of the complaint rather than as an affirmative defense. See iL at
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was a violation of clearly settled law at the time.75 Even if Siegert
were intended by the Supreme Court to require a determination of
current law,76 such a determination would not necessarily create
precedent for future courts to follow as to the clear establishment of
the right in question, depending on the circumstances of the deter-
mination.'" For example, if the court making the current-law
determination is a district court, a later appellate court may not
accord precedential weight to the earlier "clear establishment" of the
right in question 78 Further, if the court making the current-law
determination decides that the right does currently exist, but
subsequently decides under the qualified immunity framework that it
was not clearly established at the time of the conduct in question, the
current law determination would possibly constitute dicta. Such a
determination would not be essential to a holding by the court that
qualified immunity based on the past state of the law required
dismissal.'79
813 n.240 ("[Siegert] instructed lower courts to decide the 'rights' or legal sufficiency
challenge before turning to the defense of immunity.... In this way the Siegert
prescription for sequencing these issues promises some government officials even greater
freedom from the expense and time demands of litigation ... ." (emphasis added)).
According to Professors Lewis and Blumoff,
[t]his approach, by scrutinizing a component of the defense that is identical to the
'rights' element of a § 1983 plaintiff's prima facie claim, has the potential to
absolve the defendant from any liability.., by contrast, the qualified immunity
defense as such relieves the individual defendant from liability for damages alone.
Id. (emphasis added). The former approach seems to comport with the Supreme Court's
language in Mitchell v. Forsyth that the qualified immunity doctrine is intended to create
an "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." 472 U.S. 511,526 (1985)
(emphasis added); see Lewis and Blumoff, supra, at 814 n.242.
175. DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 798. According to the court in DiMeglio, the term "clearly
established" as used by the Siegert Court "has an acquired meaning referencing qualified
immunity, with its focus on law at the time of the challenged conduct." Id. Thus, when
Siegert stated the first inquiry as whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly
established right, this inquiry into the plaintiff's claim is intended to import the definition
of "clearly established" as it is used in the qualified immunity defense: clearly established
at the time of the conduct in question, not as of the current state of the law. Id The
DiMeglio court concluded: "The Court's use of the term 'clearly established' in its holding
confirms that it was conducting the typical qualified immunity analysis under Harlow and
not a[n] ... inquiry based upon current law." Id.
176. See supra note 170. Professor Shapiro interprets Siegert to require a current law
inquiry in order to solve the problematic result of qualified immunity that no new rights
will ever be clearly established if courts are relieved of the task of determining the present
state of the particular right in question. See supra note 170.
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The rationale of the Fourth Circuit panel in DiMeglio for
departing from the common interpretation of Siegert was in part
related to the policy underlying the Supreme Court's purposeful
establishment of an objective test in Harlow."8 An inquiry into the
present status of a constitutional right could potentially have no
bearing on the qualified immunity determination, which ultimately
turns on the status of the right at a point in the past: A right that
exists today did not necessarily exist at the time of the conduct in
question, and a right that existed at the time of the conduct may no
longer exist today."" If the former is true, a court could waste
valuable time and resources investigating and affirming the existence
of a present right, only to find subsequently that qualified immunity
doctrine nonetheless required the suit's dismissal because the right did
not exist at the time of the conduct."l Such a result would, accor-
ding to the Fourth Circuit, increase the burden on officials to defend
against lawsuits that ultimately are dismissed, defeating the very
purpose of Harlow of stopping insubstantial lawsuits at the summary
judgment stage.'8
In any event, the majority of the Fourth Circuit in Pinder did not
work through the DiMeglio holding and rationale in any detail."l
Rather, the opinion simply cited DiMeglio for the proposition that the
issue to be determined in Pinder, whether the due process right
allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of Pinder's
dealings with the defendant, depended only "upon an assessment of
the settled law at the time, not the law as it currently exists."' 85
Consistent with the framework for determining whether or not a
right was clearly established under Harlow and its successors,'86 the
Pinder court noted that the right must have been established "in a
particularized and relevant sense, not merely as an overarching
180. See DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790,798 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fourth Circuit also
conducted a lengthy analysis of four specific sentences in Siegert upon which the
interpretations of the other circuits likely rested, concluding that these statements had been
incorrectly analyzed. Id. at 800-03.
181. IM. at 799. This is especially true, the court noted, of statutory rights, which can
also give rise to suits under § 1983. Id.
182. See id. (citing Calhoun v. New York State Div. of Parole Officers, 999 F.2d 647,
652-55 (2d Cir. 1993), a case in which the court conducted a lengthy analysis of the current
law, finding that the plaintiff had established a constitutional claim, only to dismiss the
claim on traditional qualified immunity grounds).
183. Id. at 798.
184. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1173.
185. Id.
186. See supra notes 82-106 and accompanying text.
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entitlement to due process."'" The court recognized that a case "on
all fours with the facts [faced by an] official" is not necessary to reach
the requisite level of particularity. 8 The determination to be made
is whether " 'in light of the pre-existing law the unlawfulness' of
Johnson's conduct [was] 'apparent.' 1)189 Within the above
framework, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Pinder could not
identify any clearly established law as of the time of the alleged
violation in support of her claim.Y This conclusion was based on
the holding of DeShaney, 9' handed down sixteen days prior to the
murders of the Pinder children, which, according to the Pinder court,
"squarely rejected liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an
affirmative duty theory.'' 1 2
The court regarded the Pinder and DeShaney cases as involving
similarly poignant facts, and identical claims that the state owed a
duty because of a "special relationship" based on an awareness of
danger and a promise to give aid. 93 While "Joshua [DeShaney]'s
mother wanted the state to be held liable for its lack of action, for
merely standing by when it could have acted to prevent a tragedy[,]
187. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1173 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987)).
188. Id.
189. Id. (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).
190. Id.
191. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
192. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1174. The court reasoned that DeShaney set forth the law on
affirmative duty and its status as either "clearly established" or not at the time of the
events underlying Pinder, precisely because DeShaney was decided 16 days prior to the
events giving rise to Pinder. Id at 1173-74. Johnson argued at trial that "since DeShaney
was decided three weeks before the incident occurred, [Johnson was] uncertain about the
state of the law." Pinder v. Commissioners of Cambridge, 821 F. Supp. 376,402 n.18 (D.
Md. 1993), af'd sub nom. Pinder v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d
1169 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 530 (1995). The district court cited
Turner v. City of N. Charleston, 675 F. Supp 314, 319 (D.S.C. 1987), however, for the
proposition that it was doubtful that the DeShaney decision had any actual effect on
Officer Johnson's conduct as a police officer. Pinder, 821 F. Supp. at 402 n.18. The court
in Turner found that the defendants had insufficient notice of the existence of a due
process right under Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S.
1052 (1985), which established the "special relationship" category, when only 34 days had
elapsed between the decision and the events underlying the suit. Pinder, 821 F. Supp. at
402 n.18. Thus a decision handed down 16 days prior to Johnson's conduct did not
necessarily "settle" the law as applicable to his conduct one way or the other. In any
event, the test for qualified immunity depends not upon whether DeShaney had any effect
on Johnson's knowledge or conduct, but on whether it would have had an effect on a
reasonable officer's knowledge of the law or resulting conduct. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
193. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1174 ("The affirmative duty of protection that the Supreme
Court rejected in DeShaney is precisely the duty Pinder relies on in this case.").
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... Pinder argues Johnson could have, and thus should have, acted to
prevent Pittman's crimes."' 94 The court concluded that "DeShaney
makes clear, however, that no affirmative duty was clearly established
in these circumstances."' 195
The Fourth Circuit then denied that any exceptions to the
DeShaney no-duty rule were applicable to Pinder. The court first
considered the exception for the custodial context recognized by the
DeShaney Court. 96 No such custodial relationship existed between
the plaintiffs in Pinder and the defendant, and thus the court
concluded that "DeShaney indicates Pinder was due no affirmative
constitutional duty of protection from the state, and Johnson would
not be charged with liability for the criminal acts of a third party.'
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit, while appearing not to reject the
existence of a third exception for state-created or state-enhanced
danger altogether, stated that it was unable to "accept Pinder's
attempt to escape the import of DeShaney by characterizing her claim
as one of affirmative misconduct by the state 'in creating or enhan-
cing' the danger, instead of an omission.""' The court noted that
on the spectrum between action and inaction, at some point the
state's conduct might give rise to liability, but determined that such
a point had not been reached here.'99 Thus, the court concluded,
"[g]iven the [above] principles laid down by DeShaney, it can hardly
194. Ild.
195. Id.
196. I& The Pinder court emphasized that "[t]his Court has consistently read
DeShaney to require a custodial context before any affirmative duty can arise under the
Due Process Clause." Id at 1175 (citing Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 174-75 (4th Cir.
1994); Piechowicz v. United States, 885 F.2d 1207, 1215 (4th Cir. 1989)).
197. Id
198. Id.
199. I. The court cited Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), in support of its
argument that if the state "commit[ted] an affirmative act" or "create[d] a danger" every
time its conduct "ma[de] injury at the hands of a third party more likely," then the state
would be liable "for every crime committed by the prisoners it released." Pinder, 54 F.3d
at 1175. In Martinez, the state was granted immunity because the parole board was not
aware that the victim faced any danger as distinguished from the public at large; also,
because the crime occurred five months after the prisoner's release, the victim's death was
"too remote a consequence" of the parole board's decision to release the prisoner.
Martinez, 444 U.S. at 285. These facts differ from those in Pinder, however, because
Johnson was specifically aware that the Pinders faced a particular risk if Pittman was
released, and the burning of the house and killing of the children occurred immediately
upon Pittman's release. Furthermore, the victims' vulnerability in Pinder was due to the
reliance of their mother on the words and conduct of the releasing officer himself. See
supra notes 19-43 and accompanying text.
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be said that Johnson was faced with a clearly established duty to
protect Pinder or her children in March of 1989." 21
The Fourth Circuit found further support for its conclusion that
no duty existed in the decisions of the other circuit courts: "No court
had actually found a due process right to protection from third parties
based on mere assurances by state officials, while a number of
decisions directly or indirectly rejected just such a proposition.""
The court cited a number of cases from a majority of the circuits
limiting any affirmative state duty to protect to the custodial con-
text.' And while the court did acknowledge the existence of other
cases finding a duty outside of the custodial context,2 the court
distinguished the facts of those cases from Pinder and concluded that
the exceptions recognized in those cases did not apply.2 The court
200. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1176.
201. L (emphasis added). The en bane court appears to have oversimplified
significantly the facts of Pinder, perhaps in its haste to render the case easily dismissable
under the DeShaney Court's rejection of the "special relationship" exception. See infra
note 260 and accompanying text. The court "casually disregard[ed] the very real ways in
which Officer Johnson's conduct placed Pinder and her children in a position of danger,"
54 F.3d at 1179 (Russell, J., dissenting), rather than merely making assurances of aid like
the Department of Social Services in DeShaney. The dissent summarized the ways in
which Johnson acted affirmatively to increase (if not create) the danger to the Pinders:
Officer Johnson made assurances to Pinder that Pittman would remain in police
custody overnight and falsely represented that no county commissioner would be
available until morning. He induced Pinder to return to work and leave her
children vulnerable to Pittman's violence. After witnessing Pittman's violent
behavior and murderous threats, he charged Pittman with only minor offenses,
assuring his release. Officer Johnson had a duty to protect Pinder and her
children from Pittman, at least to an extent necessary to dispel the false sense of
security that his actions created.
Id at 1181 (Russell, J., dissenting).
202. I& at 1176 (citing McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1008 n.9 (4th Cir.), cert
denied, 115 S. Ct. 581 (1994); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1337 (6th Cir.
1993); Hilliard v. City and County of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1520 (10th Cir.), cert denied,
502 U.S. 1013 (1991); Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc., 921 F.2d 459,465
(3d Cir. 1990); Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp. Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1035-36
(11th Cir. 1987); Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923, 927 (8th Cir.
1987); Washington v. District of Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Walker
v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 511 (7th Cir.), cer denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986); Estate of Gilmore
v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714,722 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986)). However, only
five of these cases were decided prior to the events giving rise to Pinder, and can thus be
cited in support of the proposition that the right to affirmative protection was clearly
established as arising only in the custodial context at the time of the Pinder facts, if indeed
the right was so established.
203. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1176.
204. Id. at 1176-77 (citing Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348,356 (11th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1223
(7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d
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stated that those cases, upon which both the district court and dissent
from the en banc opinion relied, "[a]ll involved some circumstance
wherein the state took a much larger and direct role in 'creating' the
danger itself. These cases involved a wholly different paradigm than
that presented here."2 5 The court did admit that "[w]hen the state
itself creates the dangerous situation that resulted in a victim's injury,
the absence of a custodial relationship may not be dispositive," but it
concluded that Pinder did not belong in this category because the
state was "merely accused of a failure to act., 216
The Fourth Circuit's basis for distinguishing and for finding that
Pinder did not belong within the state-created or state-enhanced
danger exception-that Pinder involved mere omission while the other
cases involved affirmative conduct-is problematic.' The dis-
tinction between action and inaction in cases of affirmative duty- the
former of which creates liability and the latter of which does not,
according to the Fourth Circuit in Pinder-has received "extensive
criticism."" 8 The "omission" in Pinder can be seen just as easily as
an affirmative "act," and thus the argument can be made that Pinder
does fit into the state-created or state-enhanced danger exception to
277, 281 (6th Cir. 1987)).
205. lId
206. ld- at 1177.
207. See Shapiro, supra note 145, at 904 ("Clever advocates can transform action to
inaction and back again."). Professor Shapiro nevertheless recognizes that the
action/inaction distinction can be determinative in court. See id. at 905-10 (suggesting that
the DeShaney outcome turned on the litigator's decision to characterize the case as one
of state inaction, rather than one in which Joshua was worse off or more vulnerable
because of the actions of the state).
208. Blum, supra note 18, at 439 n.11. Professor Blum's "snake-pit cases reveal the
difficulties inherent in any theory of affirmative duty based on a distinction between action
and inaction," and thus Blum argues that "[i]n the snake-pit context less emphasis should
be placed on the affirmative nature of the state's acts, while rigorous scrutiny should be
given to factors of causation and culpability." Id. at 439; see also Eaton & Wells, supra
note 2, at 109 & n.9 ("In an age in which government reaches virtually every aspect of
daily life,. . . it is formalistic and naive to accord decisive weight to the difference between
active and passive defaults by officials.. .. [T]he distinction between acts and omissions
often turns on how one poses the question."). Several of the circuit courts agree: "As the
Seventh Circuit has warned... '[w]e do not want to pretend that the line between action
and inaction, between inflicting and failing to prevent the infliction of harm, is clearer than
it is.' " Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Bowers
v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)).
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DeShaney.' Several cases from other circuits help to illustrate this
fine line between action and inaction.2 0
In White v. Rochford,2 ' police officers arrested the uncle of
three minor children for drag racing on a busy Chicago highway.212
The officers refused the uncle's requests that the children be taken to
the police station or to a telephone to contact their parents, and aban-
doned all three children on the side of the highway." The children
eventually had no alternative but to leave the car, cross eight lanes of
traffic in the dark, and wander the freeway in search of a
telephone." 4 Pointing out that a clear affirmative violation of rights
would have occurred if the police had discharged children already in
their care on the same busy highway, the court concluded that the
facts of the case, a failure to aid children that resulted in their being
left alone on the highway, mandated no different conclusion. 215
Likewise, in Pinder, Johnson's conduct can be characterized as both
a series of commissions that placed the children in danger, and a
single omission, that of failing to protect from a known danger.
Wood v. Ostrander"6 involved a similar roadside abandonment
by police. The plaintiff was a passenger in a car that was pulled over
for driving with its high beams on.217 After the officer determined
209. Granted, Pinder's complaint places itself ostensibly into the "special relationship"
category, rejected by DeShaney, by arguing that Johnson's promises to incarcerate Pittman
overnight created a "special relationship" under Jensen. See supra note 142. However,
a complaint "should not be dismissed merely because Plaintiff's allegations do not support
a legal theory on which the Plaintiff intends to proceed. A Court has an obligation to
examine the Complaint and determine if the allegations provide for relief under any
possible theory." Pinder v. Commissioners of Cambridge, 821 F. Supp. 376, 382 (D. Md.
1993) (emphasis added) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 201-02 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232,246 (1980)), afjfd sub
nor. Pinder v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 530 (1995). Under this reasoning, the Pinder court had an
obligation to evaluate the plaintiffs' claim according to the most appropriate theory on the
facts of the case, arguably that of the state-created or state-enhanced danger.
210. Note that some of these cases may have been decided after the events of Pinder
took place, and therefore are not necessarily instructive as to whether the right to
affirmative protection was clearly established at the time of those events. See Pinder, 54
F.3d at 1177.
211. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
212. Id at 382.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 384. The court stated that "it seems incongruous to suggest that liability
should turn on the tenuous metaphysical construct which differentiates sins of omission
and commission." Id.
216. 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990).
217. Id. at 586.
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that the driver was intoxicated and placed him under arrest, the
officer called a tow truck to impound the vehicle, and took the
keys."' The plaintiff was left to find her own way home. She
eventually accepted a ride from a stranger, who took her to a
secluded area and raped her.219 The area in which the plaintiff was
abandoned by the officer had one of the highest rates of aggravated
crime in the county.' In the context of a qualified immunity
inquiry, the court held that, in light of the White decision and several
other Seventh Circuit decisions recognizing the existence of a state-
created or state-enhanced danger category of affirmative duty,"' the
plaintiff in Wood indeed had alleged the existence of a right that was
clearly established at the time of the incident underlying her
claim.' The fact that the defendant officer's conduct could have
as easily been characterized as an omission (failing to protect the
plaintiff from the known dangers to which the officer had exposed
her) was irrelevant; the defendant officer's' immunity was denied,
and summary judgment in his favor was reversed.224
In Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake,' two prison inmates,
while working with a community work program in Highland Lake,
Alabama, abducted a town hall employee and terrorized her for three
days, finally leaving her tied to a tree in a neighboring state.? The
plaintiff claimed that the state violated her "constitutionally protected




221. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204-05 (7th Cir. 1983)
(acknowledging that liability under § 1983 lies in cases like White, where police
affirmatively put children in danger, but distinguishing the facts of Jackson from those in
White), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir.
1982) (noting that if the state places an individual in a position of danger from a private
party, liability will attach for its participation in the harm, but distinguishing the facts of
Bowers as indicating a mere failure to protect).
222. Wood, 879 F.2d at 595-96.
223. Only one officer was involved in abandoning the plaintiff at the scene. The
plaintiff also named the chief officer of the Washington State Patrol in her lawsuit, but the
court affirmed the lower court's dismissal as to the chief officer. Id. at 586.
224. Id. at 596. The court concluded that the plaintiff had indeed raised a genuine issue
of fact as to whether the officer in question violated her constitutional rights by
"affirmatively placing [the plaintiff] in danger and then abandoning her." Id. For this
reason, the court determined that summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity
was improper. Id.
225. 880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990).
226. Id. at 349-50.
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criminal actions of work squad inmates."' The court first indicated
that the Eleventh Circuit had previously recognized that a plaintiff
may show a duty on the state's part by establishing that the plaintiff
faced a special danger, as distinguished from the dangers faced by the
general public.' The court then found that the state both created
the danger to the plaintiff presented by the work squad inmates'
and increased her vulnerability and exposure to that danger by virtue
of her position as town clerk.3" Because the defendants' actions
" 'set in motion the specific forces that allowed [the inmates] to
commit [their] crime,' "' the court found a "sufficiently close nexus
between the defendants' actions" in bringing the inmates to town and
then failing to adequately protect the plaintiff from them and the
resulting harm to the plaintiff2 to reverse the dismissal of the
case.23
3
227. Id. at 349.
228. Id. at 354 (citing Jones v. Phyfer, 761 F.2d 642 (11th Cir. 1985)).
229. Thus the court distinguished these facts from DeShaney. Id. at 355-56.
230. Id. at 356.
231. Id. at 357 (quoting Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277, 281 (6th Cir.
1987)).
232. Id. at 358. The court spoke in terms of causation and culpability, not in terms of
omission/commission: "Not only do these facts show that the defendants['] actions were
highly culpable, they also show that the defendants were aware of the danger present from
the community work squad inmates yet did nothing to alleviate or protect against the
danger." Id. See infra notes 255-59 and accompanying text for support of the culpability/
causation approach.
233. Cornelius, 880 F.2d at 359. Several later decisions have questioned the continuing
viability of the holding in Cornelius on the basis of the Supreme Court's holding in Collins
v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992). See Lovins v. Lee, 53 F.3d 1208, 1211
(11th Cir. 1995); Wooten v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 696,700 n.4 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 379 (1995); Pettco Enters. v. White, 896 F. Supp. 1137, 1149 (M.D. Ala. 1995). Collins
arose from the death of a city sanitation worker from asphyxia while he was working in
a sewage drain. Collins, 503 U.S. at 117. The worker's widow claimed that the city had
a duty to provide its employees with reasonably safe working conditions. Id. at 126. The
Court held that a voluntary employment relationship between the state and an individual
does not impose a constitutional duty on a government employer to provide a reasonably
safe working environment. Id. at 126-30. The Eleventh Circuit cases that questioned the
holding of Cornelius in light of Collins characterized Cornelius as a "special relationship"
due process claim, pointing out that the employer-employee relationship between a
plaintiff and the state was held in Collins not to create any duty of safety on the part of
the state. Lovins, 53 F.3d at 1211; Wooten, 49 F.3d at 700 n.4. However, Cornelius can
alternatively be characterized as a state-created or -enhanced danger case, see supra notes
228-33 and accompanying text, in which case the "special relationship" aspect is not
determinative of affirmative duty. See Pettco, 896 F. Supp. at 1149 (acknowledging the
questioned viability of Cornelius after Collins, but also noting the alternative creation of
a duty on the part of the state to protect from the actions of third parties when the
plaintiff faces a "special danger").
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Likewise, the facts in Pinder can be assessed in terms of
culpability and causation, rather than the formalistic distinction
between action and inaction. Pinder contended that Johnson made
no attempt to warn or contact her about Pittman's release, nor did
Johnson monitor Pittman in any way after his release, despite
Johnson's knowledge of the potentially imminent danger faced by
Pinder and her children at Pittman's hands. Certainly on its face this
allegation smacks of a "special relationship" claim, that a duty was
owed because Johnson knew of the danger, had previously promised
protection from it, and then failed to deliver on that promise.
However, Johnson's actions in total arguably played a much larger
role in the tragedy that befell the Pinders than mere knowledge and
omission.' Because of the assurances to Pinder that the danger
she and her children faced was removed, "the world that [Johnson]
released Pittman into after his physical custody was materially
changed." 5  Had Johnson not made such assurances knowing that
Pinder would rely on them, Pinder might not have returned to work
without first securing some protection, whether through a neighbor or
by other means. If she could not have secured such protection, she
could have stayed home herself. Thus, the world created by
Johnson's assurances was one in which the Pinder children were
defenseless to the danger posed by Pittman. 6  Not only was this
234. This is the point at which the line between action and inaction (and thus the
difference between liability and nonliability, respectively) becomes blurred, and yet crucial.
In causational terms, Johnson arguably set in motion an "unbroken chain of reasonably
foreseeable events," Brady v. Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476, 484 (1943), that led to the
Pinder children's deaths. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining "proximate cause" as "[tjhat which, in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred"); cf. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971) ("The
defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without
it."). But if one must depend on the formalistic action/inaction distinction as a critical
determination in an affirmative duty context, without reference to causation or culpability,
the confusion will continue. See Blum, supra note 18, at 439 (arguing that "less emphasis
should be placed on the affirmative nature of the state's acts, while rigorous scrutiny
should be given to the factors of causation and culpability").
235. Pinder v. Commissioners of Cambridge, 821 F. Supp. 376,396 (D. Md. 1993), affd
sub nom. Pinder v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir.) (en
banc), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 530 (1995).
236. Here, the appropriate mode of analysis is technically that of the state-enhanced
danger because the danger to the Pinders from Pittman existed before Johnson arrived on
the scene. But see Blum, supra note 18, at 458 ("No clear line separates the state-created
danger cases from the enhancement-of-risk cases, and most snake-pit situations may fairly
be characterized as containing elements of both."). As the en banc court noted in
rejecting Pinder's characterization of the claim as one of state-created or state-enhanced
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directly caused by Johnson's earlier assurances, but it was reinforced
by his action in arresting and detaining Pittman. At the very least,
Johnson arguably had an affirmative duty under the circumstances to
"phone Pinder and warn her that Pittman had been released from
police custody,' 17 that is, to undo the material change he had
effected on the Pinder children's world.
The dissent focused on this very distinction between action and
inaction as the basis for its disagreement with the holding of the
majority."8 First, the dissent argued that the right to affirmative
protection when the state, by affirmative action, creates a danger to
the plaintiff or renders an already imperiled plaintiff more vulnerable
to danger, was indeed clearly established at the time of Officer
Johnson's actions 9  Previously established through a series of
courts of appeals decisions, this category of duty survived DeShaney
as one of the two remaining categories of possible affirmative
duty.2' The dissent concluded that a reasonable officer in
Johnson's position would have recognized that his actions placed the
danger, "[n]o amount of semantics can disguise the fact that the real 'affirmative act' here
[which caused the ultimate deaths] was committed by Pittman, not by Officer Johnson."
Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1175. But this assertion fails to acknowledge the fact that Johnson
created the circumstances making it possible for that act to be committed by Pittman, and
thus increased the Pinders' danger in a way in which it would not have been increased had
Johnson never been involved, even though he may not literally have created the danger
to the Pinders. See supra note 201.
237. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1182 (Russell, J., dissenting).
238. Id at 1180-81 (Russell, J., dissenting) ("Officer Johnson was not merely aware of
the danger; he placed Pinder and her children in a position of danger.... I cannot
understand how the majority can recount these same events in its own opinion and not
[reach the same conclusion].").
239. Id at 1179-80 (Russell, J., dissenting) (citing Wells v. Walker, 852 F.2d 368,370-71
(8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211,
1223 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811
F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1987); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266,269 (9th Cir.
1986); Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 194 (4th Cir. 1984); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d
616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985)). The dissent acknowledged
that Jensen's definition of the special relationship-resulting from the state's awareness of
a particular victim's danger and expression of willingness to protect the victim from that
danger-was rejected by the DeShaney Court. Id. at 1180 (Russell, J., dissenting); see also
supra notes 133-44 and accompanying text. However, the dissent pointed out that Jensen
"is still good law" on the proposition that a duty arises in the state-created or state-
enhanced danger context. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1180 (Russell, J., dissenting); see also supra
notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 239. The dissent concluded that DeShaney did not reject this
category because "[t]he fact that the state did not create the danger [in DeShaney] was
central to the Court's holding." Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1180 (Russell, J., dissenting).
1996] 1755
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Pinders in danger, given his assurances to Pinder,24' and given that
he knew these assurances induced Pinder to return to work without
further security for her children.2 42  The reasonable officer in
Johnson's position would also, in the dissent's view, have recognized
his duty to protect the Pinders somehow from the danger he helped
to create, even if only with a warning telephone call.243
Whether or not the state of the law of affirmative duty, even in
the context of a state-created or state-enhanced danger, was "clearly
established" at the time of the events in question, such that a
reasonable officer in Johnson's place would have recognized a duty to
do something more than simply release Pittman, the Fourth Circuit
did a disservice to future § 1983 plaintiffs by the method through
which it granted Johnson's qualified immunity. First, by relying on
DiMeglio for the authority to disregard the current state of the law of
affirmative duty on these facts,2' the court allowed the confusion it
had itself identified as inherent in this doctrine to prevail to the
detriment of future § 1983 plaintiffs. Under the framework employed
by the court, no judicial body will ever be required to determine the
existence of a right to affirmative protection in the context of
qualified immunity claimed in a § 1983 action.
The DiMeglio approach, which does not require courts to
determine whether a right currently exists as well as whether it existed
at a particular past moment, allows the status of theretofore unes-
tablished rights to remain necessarily and perpetually unclear.24 If
241. The dissent also pointed out that Johnson only charged Pittman with two mis-
demeanors, and that this caused the county commissioner to release Pittman immediately
on his own recognizance. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1181 (Russell, J., dissenting). This
undercharging in light of Pittman's violent nature, which Johnson previously had witnessed,
also contributed to the danger in which Johnson's actions affirmatively placed the Pinders.
Id. (Russell, J., dissenting).
242. Id. (Russell, J., dissenting).
243. Id at 1181-82 (Russell, J., dissenting).
244. See supra notes 164-85 and accompanying text.
245. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 93, at 1734-35 (The Harlow test encourages lower
courts "to deny relief without deciding whether a constitutional violation in fact occurred.
By restricting the opportunity for judges to address novel claims, [the Harlow decision]
thus tend[s] to freeze the development of constitutional law."). Professors Fallon and
Meltzer discuss the jurisprudential approaches to "new law," the term used to denote the
Harlow test's failure to allow the development of novel areas of constitutional law, and
conclude that "the jurisprudence of new law needs to be rethought." 11. at 1758. For
similar treatment of "new law" issues in the federal habeus area, see Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288 (1989). In refusing to create "new law" in most federal habeus cases, the
Supreme Court has "further stifl[ed] the development of constitutional law in the realm
of criminal procedure" as well. Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 174, at 780 n.113 (citing
Teague, 489 U.S. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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no court is ever required to determine that a right currently exists, but
every court is only looking backward, no previously unestablished
right will ever be born such that a future plaintiff can point to it as
having been clearly established at some definite point. Under this
rule, the situation for plaintiffs is even more dire than the dissenter
on the Fourth Circuit panel described: "Unfortunately, perhaps, the
first plaintiff to assert a good cause of action against an individual
defendant for violation of a constitutional right, previously undefined,
must go away empty handed, but that is the law and the defendant is
entitled to the benefit of it."246  This statement implies that a
plaintiff; having been the first to assert a cognizable claim under a
newly claimed right, might go away empty-handed herselt but that
such a result is palatable because she will have established the new
right proactively for all plaintiffs to follow.
The DiMeglio rule relied on in Pinder, however, allows plaintiffs
to go away empty-handed and without having established anything for
future plaintiffs to depend upon, even if the right could have been
found to be currently established at the time of the conduct at issue.
With respect to Pinder's claimed due process right, the court looked
at a particular moment in the past, determined that the right was not
established at the time Johnson allegedly violated it, and stopped
there. Having relied on DeShaney for the determination that the
right did not exist in the past,247 the court refused to consider the
relevance of any law established by cases decided after DeShaney,
dismissing the plaintiff's reliance on these cases: "[A] number of the
cases plaintiff relies upon were decided months or years after
Johnson's dealings with Pinder and so are not relevant to our
assessment of the clearly established law at the time.""24 Under such
a framework, absent legislative action, the law would never change or
adapt. While the Harlow Court certainly had the protection of
officials from frivolous lawsuits foremost in its consciousness 9 it
246. Pinder v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 368, 375 (4th Cir. 1994) (Roney, J., dissenting), rev'd,
54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dented, 116 S. Ct. 530 (1995).
247. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
248. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1177. Apart from the relevance of these later cases to the
current state of the law as to Pinder's right to affirmative protection, the court is not
entirely correct in stating that the later cases are not relevant to an assessment of the
clearly established law at the time. The post-DeShaney cases that reaffirm an affirmative
duty established in pre-DeShaney cases are relevant to indicate that this duty was not done
away with in all of its various forms by the DeShaney decision.
249. See supra notes 70-72, 80-82, 90-92 and accompanying text. But see Lewis &
Blumoff, supra note 174, at 782 ("Ironically, given the justifications for its creation, the
new qualified immunity has proven difficult to administer; an increasingly complex
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clearly intended to balance this protection, in the form of preserving
the status quo of clearly established rights, against the fact that an
action for damages by a wronged citizen is "the only realistic avenue
for vindication of constitutional guarantees."'
Thus, the Harlow test, as informed by the DiMeglio approach, is
not an effective mode of analyzing Pinder's claim from a plaintiff's
perspective because without the requirement that a court decide the
current status of the right to affirmative protection as well as the
status at the time in question, the court denies opportunities for
future plaintiffs to assert new rights.
The second problematic aspect of the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Pinder is its treatment of the particular right to affirmative protection
at the time of the events underlying Pinder. In its determination that
the right to affirmative protection did not exist at the time Johnson
acted, the court confused what little of this doctrine could have been
found to be "clearly established" in March 1989. DeShaney clearly
left open two potential categories as viable circumstances in which
such a right could arise-the custodial context and the state-created
or state-enhanced danger. 1 The Pinder court's evaluation of the
facts, however, placed the plaintiff's claim squarely within the Jensen
"special relationship" category, which was clearly rejected by
DeShaney, denying the fact that the Pinder facts potentially fit within
the state-created or state-enhanced danger category. Whether this
was to avoid the risk of a "hard facts, bad law" decision," - or
jurisprudence of appellate jurisdiction consumes much of the same time and funds of
officials that the doctrine sought to spare."); A. Allise Burris, Note, Qualifying Immunity
in Section 1983 and Bivens Actions, 71 TEx. L. REv. 123, 125 (1992) (noting that "the
resources of plaintiffs, defendants, and the judicial system are wasted deciding immunity
issues rather than spent compensating plaintiffs, exonerating or punishing defendants, or
resolving cases on their merits").
250. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982). Unfortunately for plaintiffs,
perhaps the Supreme Court intended to stagnate the law of official government liability
in this manner. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional
Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641 (1987). Professors Eisenberg and Schwab first
discuss the nationwide perception of a civil rights litigation explosion, see, e.g., supra note
63 (citing statistics on civil rights lawsuits per year), and suggest consequences of that
perception. They then report the results of an empirical study suggesting that this
perception is overstated and even "borders on myth." Eisenberg & Schwab, supra, at 643.
The judicial consequence of this perceived explosion has been a trend toward carefully
limiting § 1983 plaintiffs' access to the courts, as the "perceived explosion ... shapes
doctrinal development in the Supreme Court." Id at 646-47.
251. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
252. See pt. V of Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1178-79 (plurality opinion), where the court
discusses the dangers of "[t]ragic circumstances [which] only sharpen our hindsight," and
the recognition of "a broad constitutional right to affirmative protection" as the "first step
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whether the court was simply confused, it ignored an entire body of
law from the other federal circuits establishing such a category in
which the right to protection can arise5 3 Perhaps the state of the
law of affirmative duty was not clearly established at the time Johnson
acted; perhaps, indeed, "a clear consensus has yet to emerge on the
criteria for defining the circumstances that give rise to a constitutional
duty of the state to provide protection to persons from private acts of
violence."'  But the Pinder court unnecessarily obscured the
debate by placing the Pinder facts in the wrong category altogether.
It should have recognized the extent to which Johnson's actions at
least increased the Pinders' danger, in order to further confirm the
existence of the third exception.
A better approach to the determination of the existence of
affirmative duties on the part of state actors is to focus, not on the
arbitrary line between commission and omission, action and inaction,
but on the factors of causation and culpability." As Professors
Eaton and Wells note, "[t]he best approach to such cases is to begin
from the premise, abundantly supported in the Court's precedents,
that the due process clause protects a person's life and health against
egregious misconduct by government officers." 6  Professor Blum
suggests a method of inquiry for these cases based on culpability,
which plays a role at two different points. The first question should
be whether a state actor deliberately acted or failed to act, "knowing
that the act or omission was substantially certain to create an
unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff or arbitrarily enhance the
danger" the plaintiff faced. 7  The second inquiry should be
whether the state actor who knowingly exposed the plaintiff to danger
by his act or omission "was deliberately indifferent to the need to
ameliorate or provide protection from the situation created. 'z8
down the slippery slope of liability." Id. at 1178 (plurality opinion). But see Eaton &
Wells, supra note 2, at 132 ("One should approach slippery slope arguments with caution.
Most statements of legal principle may be criticized on slippery slope grounds.").
253. See Eaton & Wells, supra note 2, at 133 ("There exists in the lower federal courts
an increasingly well defined body of case law identifying the relevant considerations and
distinctions bearing on constitutional liability for nonfeasance.").
254. See Blum, supra note 18, at 435 (emphasis added); see also Eaton & Wells, supra
note 2, at 110 (stating that the "panoply of approaches" taken by the Court in DeShaney
"reveals the substantial uncertainty that remains in this area of the law, and thus highlights
the need for developing a coherent framework for analyzing affirmative duty cases").
255. See Blum, supra note 18, at 439.
256. Eaton & Wells, supra note 2, at 166.
257. Blum, supra note 18, at 480.
258. Id
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This test recognizes that the formalism of the purported bright line
between action and inaction is arbitrary and inadequate to deal with
the complexity of this area of the law. 9
The Fourth Circuit, in its apparent haste to rid itself of especially
hard facts to avoid making bad law, ironically did just that, by placing
Pinder into the most easily dismissable category,2" and denying that
any other applicable category might apply to these facts despite
authority to the contrary. The court could arguably have found, even
while placing the Pinder facts in the appropriate category of the state-
created or state-enhanced danger, that the right to protection under
the circumstances faced by Johnson was not "clearly established" at
the time Johnson acted. Such a decision would have served the dual
purpose of allowing dismissal of this particular case (which the court
clearly desired) based on qualified immunity grounds, but affirming
(and thus further "clearly establishing") the state-created or state-
enhanced danger category as a viable area of affirmative state duty
for future plaintiffs.
By refusing to acknowledge the applicability of this third category
on facts that seemed to call for its application, the court further
perpetuated the confusion surrounding the law of affirmative duty and
qualified immunity. Unfortunately, if "even well settled principles of
law" will admittedly bend in the face of hard facts,"1 what will come
of the mixture of future hard cases with sometimes misapplied, non-
settled principles such as those involved in qualified immunity and
affirmative duty is still anyone's guess.
MELINDA J. SEEDS
259. Id. at 480-81. Blum concludes that
[t]he complexity and variety of situations in which the affirmative duty should be
recognized dictate that careful attention be paid to the level of culpability
required in order to establish a breach of the duty, and close scrutiny be given
to the causal connection between the challenged behavior and the resulting harm.
Id at 481.
260. The decision placed the case in the "special relationship" category, based on the
state's awareness of the danger to the plaintiff and/or its promise of aid. This was the
category most clearly rejected by DeShaney. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying
text.
261. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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